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Cruise ship mishaps and disastersThe core of the cruise industry experience is to provide a pleasant recreation for the customer. When a mishap/
disaster on a cruise ship occurs it can put the customer at serious risk. Although rare and, preciselywhy they are a
rare phenomenon, cruise ship mishaps receive global media attention when they do occur which can cost the
cruise ship companies millions of dollars in lost revenue. Further, some regulators are questioning the safety
practices of the cruise industry.
There is little academic research on the causes of cruise line mishaps. Merchant vessel mishaps, however, have
been greatly investigated. The goal of this research is to contribute to the understanding of the nature ofmishaps
in the current cruise industry by evaluating 580 mishap incidents from 1989 to 2013 through a two-stage mea-
surement design. This novel application of this methodology may provide a new insight into mishap evaluation
research. Under this method, an evaluation of what happened during a reported mishap is done. Then, the
incident report data are used to evaluate and classify the cause of the mishap. This classiﬁcation may reveal
what factors contribute to cruise ship mishaps and start to lay a foundation of operator preparedness.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
The cruise ship experience as a recreational experience has been a
relatively recent phenomenon. Due to the dominance of passenger air
transportation, passenger ocean liner services ceased operations in
1986. However, beginning in 1986, the Cunard Lines saw that a niche
market could be exploited where passengers would prefer ocean cruis-
ing as recreation (Cunard Lines, 2014). Since that time, cruising has
shown to be one of the fastest growing vacation ventures over the last
20 years (Holt & Wang, 2014). In the United States alone, the cruise in-
dustry generated more than $42 billion in total economic activity, in-
volving over 356,000 jobs (Cruise Line International Association
(CLIA), 2014). In Europe, the cruise sector generated a direct and indi-
rect employment of over 315,000 jobs, reﬂecting a 75% increase in a
ﬁve year timespan (Cruise Line International Association (CLIA), 2014).
In 2013, 20.9 million passengers experienced a cruise and the indus-
try saw an annual growth rate in passengers traveled ranging from 1.3%
to 184.6% depending on the market location (CLIA, 2014). The annual
growth rate of cruise ship passengers worldwide from 1999 to 2013angw@tamug.edu (G. Wang),
. This is an open access article underhas been about 3.1% annually where the number of passengers in 1999
was 6,337,000, and in 2013, it was 20,976,000 (Cruisemarket.Com.,
20143). As the demographics of the United States, Western Europe,
and parts of Asia age, the demand for cruises is projected to increase
as retirees look for vacations to exotic locations while experiencing the
glamor and luxury of a cruise ship.
In recent years, we saw several high proﬁle disasters or mishap
events with cruise lines. With the 2012 Costa Concordia disaster and
subsequent event with Carnival Triumph, questions regarding cruise
line safety are beginning to surface. In the case of the Costa Concordia
the ship struck a rock near the Italian island of Giglio causing the ship
to roll on its side costing 32 passengers their lives (Cruisecritic.Com.,
2014). When the Carnival Triumph lost electrical power due to an en-
gine room ﬁre, 3143 passengers were left adrift in the Gulf of Mexico
for days (Grifﬁn & Bronstein, 2013). With the global media attention
of these events, the industry faced investigations and other legal actions
on safety concerns.
Although the industry is well regulated by the SOLAS Convention
(Safety of Life at Sea), the United States Senate Committee on3 Cruisemarket's proprietary database tracks daily ticket prices at the cabin category
level and passenger volumes to port destinations from over 10,000 annual cruises world-
wide from 35 cruise lines. Further, it tracks daily ticket prices at the cabin category level
and passenger volumes to port destinations from over 10,000 annual cruises worldwide
from 35 cruise lines.
the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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side the United States have begun to investigate some of the causes of
these events and practices of the industry in an effort to address new
potential regulations on cruise ships. Although there is a wealth of
scholarly literature addressing the merchant disasters and mishap
events (NTSB, 2014), there is a paucity of scholarly research on current
cruise ship mishaps. This research paper attempts to ﬁll the gap in the
research by exploring the causes of cruise ship mishaps through the
evaluation of 580 cruise ship events from 1989 to 2013. Using the
two-stage measurement design methodology on the data gathered
from www.cruisejunkie.com on each incident and conﬁrmed with
other sources, we ﬁrst evaluate what happened and what caused what
happened classifying the cause of each mishap.
2. Previous literature on cruise line shipping
Much of the academic research on cruise line shipping has focused on
the tourism and business opportunities for the operators and ports of call.
For example, Veronneau and Roy (2009) investigate practices and chal-
lenges of the cruise line corporation. These practices and challenges can
include increased consolidation of cruise line operators (Hobson &
Perry, 1994). Wood (2000) evaluates the growth of Caribbean cruise
tourismwhereas Cartwright and Baird (1999) look at the global develop-
ment and growth of the cruise industry. Other literature reviews the eco-
nomic impact of cruise tourismonnations and ports including howmuch
passengers spend (Dwyer, Douglas, & Livaic, 2004; Dwyer & Forsyth,
1996; Henthorne, 2000). Further, passenger satisfaction with the cruise
experience is also highlighted in several articles including the recovery
of ticket price if the recreational experience is jeopardized through a
cruise ship mishap (Kirby, 1991; Marti, 1992; Teye & Lecerc, 1998).
The business decision by cruise ship operator of port selection
has also been well researched (Marti, 1990, 1991) as has the history
of the renaissance of cruising as a recreational, vacation destination
(Kwortnik, 2006). Failures and successes of cruise line businesses are
been also studied including successful patterns of operations (Lawton
and Butler, 1987; Douglas, 2001). In this paper, however, we will
focus on mishaps/disasters of cruise ship operations.
3. Safety regulations and possible causes of mishaps
The origins of cruise safety regulations were precipitated by the
Titanic disaster in 1912. The SOLAS Convention or the International Con-
vention for the Safety of Life was ﬁrst adopted in 1914. This convention
and all its successive forms are regarded as the most important of all
international treaties concerning the safety of merchant ships (IMO,
2014). Cruise ships are “like cargo vessels” for the purpose of this
Convention (Stopford, 2009).
There is vast and abundant literature on merchant ship safety and
mishaps. Much of the literature addresses the health of seafarer at sea in-
cluding stress, fatigue, communicable diseases, exposure to hazardous
substances and skin cancer (Oldenburg, Baur, & Schlaich, 2010). Further,
the research conﬁrms that seafaring has been recognized as one of the
most dangerous occupationswith deaths frommaritime disasters, illness,
suicides, homicides and occupational accidents (Nielsen, 1999; Nielsen &
Roberts, 1998; Roberts, 2008). Major causes of mortality from shipping
disasters include vessels foundering in typhoons, storms and severe
gales, explosions in cargo holds and collisions in poor visibility (Roberts,
2008). For the current cruise linemishap literature, the health of the pas-
sengers and crew dominants the research such as the outbreak on the
Aurora and the negative reaction of Greek and Spanish governments to
the incident (Elliot, Harris, & Baron, 2005). Of course, terrorism on cruise
ships is a new concern (Bowen, Fidgeon, & Page, 2014; Carafano, 2007).
In general, most of the literature conﬁrms that the majority of mis-
haps (up to 80%) are due to an element of human error. The literature
further focuses on the best practice of creating a climate of safety aboard
vessels (Baniela & Rios, 2011; Lu & Tsai, 2008). There is, however, apaucity of current research speciﬁcally on cruise ship operationmishaps
outside of the illness outbreaks of passengers and crew. This paper will
attempt to address this gap in the literature. Further, since the loss of life
on a cruise ship may be greater in a mishap due to the sheer number of
persons aboard a cruise ship versus a merchant ship, cruise ship
mishaps may require special attention in the research.4. Literature on cruise ship mishaps/disaster
The attention of cruise safety has been an imperative because of the
number of human lives at stake on any given cruise. The number of
passengers per cruise can be as high as 4000+ passengers per vessel.
Although the risk may be small for the loss of human life, the issue of
safety for cruise ships is emotional, and it is this emotional response to
human life that causes cruise ship incidents to receive high attention
from the media and the public.
Unlike the intensiﬁed concern for tanker vessel accidents after the
Exxon Valdez in 1989, the studies of cruise failures or passenger vessel
accidents have received less attention in maritime literature. Even
though previous cruise accidents have resulted in huge damage of prop-
erty and a large numbers of fatalities, the causes of the incidents of pas-
senger vessels are rarely found in the literature. Among 116 marine
accidents from 1988 to 2014 that involved US vessels or on the US wa-
ters, 37% were related to passenger vessels (National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB), 2014). In 2013 alone, the United States Coast
Guard (USCG) Maritime Information Exchange reported that 44
inspected passenger vessels were directly involved in the incidents,
such as collision, sinking, capsizing of vessels, or indirectly, such as
vessels providing emergency assistance or witnessing the event. Cruise
ship safety is, in fact, excellent with only 16 fatalities out of more than
100 million passengers worldwide for the years 2005 to 2012 (Carne,
2012). In the period from 1988 to 2014, only eleven incidents were
associated with large cruise lines. To reduce accidents and save lives,
one of the top ten safety issues highlighted by the NTSB in the US in
2014 is the advance passenger vessel safety (Holt & Wang, 2014).
As noted above, given that the cruise industry has gained interest
from the academic world with research addressing the development
of cruise markets, geography of port selection, itinerary and choice of
destination, and cruise tourism, attention on cruise failures and
accidents are very limited. Few examples are Talley, B. D. J., and Kite-
Powell (2008) on the severity of cruise vessel accidents, Lois, Wang,
Wall, and Ruxton (2004) on cruise safety assessment, and Lu and
Tseng (2012) on ferry passenger safety.
Talley et al. (2008) study the determinants of property damage and
injury severity from cruise vessel accidents. In their study, they evaluate
various types of accidents including collisions, equipment failure, explo-
sion, ﬁre ﬂooding, grounding, breakaway, capsize and sinking with
regard to the cost of damage. They ﬁnd that explosion accidents have
the highest unit damage cost per vessel gross ton. Further, they deter-
mine that human factors increase fatal and non-fatal injuries more
than vessel and environmental factors.
Lois et al. (2004) address cruise ships from a pre-disaster perspec-
tive. They evaluate nine case studies and propose a safety assessment
methodology. They conclude that there are four potential countermea-
sures to address prior to a cruise safety mishap. First, interventions can
prevent certain causes of disaster. Here they list proper equipment,
training, detailed procedures and preventative maintenance as the
appropriate interventions. Second, they list intervention before an inci-
dent where enhanced surveys, communication equipment, alarms, re-
mote sensors and check-off list for routine evolutions are imperative.
Third, drills to respond to common incidents and special procedures
for higher risk evolutions are interventions before an incident. And
ﬁnally, they enumerate interventions before the consequence of the
incident such as response plans, emergency drills, lifesaving equipment,
emergency instructions and crew training.
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safety on passenger ferries. They identify crucial safety assessment
criteria using empirical methods. They ﬁnd that crewmembers' abilities
were the most important factors in assessing passenger ferry safety.
Safety equipment, ship structure, navigation, communication, ship
documentation inspection and safety instructions, all required under
SOLAS, are considered secondary.
5. Research questions and methods
The goal of this paper is to ﬁll the gap on the research and to contrib-
ute to the understanding of the nature of mishaps in the cruise industry
by evaluating 580 mishap incidents from 1989 to 2013 through a two-
stage measurement design (Fischer, Cullen, & Turner, 2000). In analyz-
ing a problem, often determiningwhat happened in the past is critical to
any further analysis. Further, the cause of what happened is the ﬁrst
step in correction or solution of the problem. Thismethodological appli-
cation, used in criminal reporting sociological studies, is a novel ap-
proach to the investigation of mishaps/disasters. First what happened
is determined and then the cause of what happened is determined.
This methodology looks at the frequency of an occurrence as a measure
of the severity and societal cost of a problemwheremonetary values are
not reported, not estimated or not comparable. Prevention of disaster/
mishap can be evaluated similar to prevention of crime where under-
standing the type of crime and cause can address prevention.
Qualitative analysis research looks at in-depth case study while
quantitative analysis addresses panel data with time series and cross
sectional dimensions. However, this study provides a broad overview
to create an awareness of incidents which are rare but may be more
costly than other vessel market segments. Further, due to the unique-
ness to cruise ship operation, prevention solutions may differ greatly
frommerchant vessels. The two-stage measurement design is an inqui-
ry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in which multiple
sources of evidence are used across multiple cases and time periods.
This methodology relies on descriptive statistics in reporting ﬁndings.
6. Two-stage measurement design
The two-stage measurement design draws on the ability to analyze
with two questions simultaneously:What happened? Andwhat caused
what happened?This parallel use of the datamay better assist collection
of data on mishaps/disasters.
In order to execute the two stages ofwhat happened andwhat caused
what happened, we delineate the entire process of the two-stage design.
First, we deﬁne a mishap/disaster. Second, we deﬁne the population of
mishaps to be collected and reviewed. Third, we review and collect data
on the mishaps. Fourth, we determine the cause of the mishap. Fifth, we
categorize the mishaps in a systematic way to determine a pattern of
causation. The entire process is performed cooperatively by all authors.
The deﬁnition of mishap/disaster, the unit of analysis for this study,
is the cruise ship incident where there is an adverse outcome reported,
regardless of severity, to the recreational experience involving the oper-
ations of the ship. It does not, however, include illness outbreaks. We
deﬁne the population of mishaps as 580 separate cases of cruise
mishaps for the years 1989 to 2014 reported to and collected by
cruisejunkie.com, andwe rely on the cruisejunkie.comdataset to initial-
ly screen that a reported event is a mishap. However, we do verify the
incidents through other sources described below. This reference period
for deﬁning the population, with the initial year of 1989, represents the
beginning of the growth of cruise ship experience as a formof recreation
(Cunard Lines, 2014) rather than transportation.
Next, we attempt to collect detailed information on what occurred
during the mishap incident including the type of mishap and the
cause or causes as reported from various sources. This information
becomes a part of the incident report in thedataset.Wedescribe this de-
tailed information under the data source section. We then determinewhat factors contributed to the mishap verifying the cause. Further,
we address in this step the SOLAS regulations in mind. SOLAS identiﬁes
the safety concern requirements into three areas: the ship design, the
crew safety procedures and the maintenance of ship equipment. Fur-
ther, in Mileski and Honeycutt (2013), failures can occur in three
areas causing the mishap or disaster: pre-incident planning, the right
implementation of the plan or use of resource, and ﬂexible, well-
maintained resources.
Finally, we categorize the cause of the reportedmishap. The speciﬁc-
ity of the categories is described below. The severity of themishap is not
classiﬁed merely the cause, although severity is another valid way of
categorization. The types or categories of cause are constructed bymar-
rying the SOLAS safety concerns with the elements to avoid disaster
under Mileski and Honeycutt (2013). We anticipate that the causal
factors ofmishapsmay fall into the following categories: the ship design
(pre-disaster planning), crew training or human error (right implemen-
tation of the plan or use of resources) and maintenance of the ship
(ﬂexible well-maintained resources). However, we review all incidents
to determine other causes not listed above.
The resulting data furnish a systematic analysis of the causes of
recent cruise mishaps. Construct validity and external validity are
established through the use of multiple sources within themain dataset
described below. Internal validity is addressed by evaluating the ﬁnd-
ings of the investigation of a cruise event, i.e., x led to y, reported in
the dataset. Finally, reliability is established through the protocol of
categorization of the incident also described below.
7. Data sources
The information on cruise ship mishaps is available through an
archival dataset of incidents reported. The dataset contains detailed
reports on the nature of the events that happened (what happened)
during cruise ship event (mishap). The information in the dataset is
numerous and detailed enough to evaluate what occurred during the
incident. The information is also used to classify or categorize the type
of cause of the incident. Further, the dataset is chosen for its standardi-
zation of measurement across incidents and years providing valid com-
parability. The archival information is available through the website,
www.cruisejunkie.com. The author of this website is Ross A. Klein,
Ph.D. of Memorial University of Newfoundland in St. John's, Newfound-
land. Dr. Klein has authoredmany books and publications regarding the
cruise ship industry, and has testiﬁed before the US Congress in 2012
and 2013 regarding cruise incidents Klein, 2014.
The data in this publication are collected from archival sources of
publically know cruise ship incidents. The information is published for
the years 1972 to date. The multiple archival sources include news
reports, Lloyd's List Casualty Report, Cruise Industry News Quarterly,
IHS Fairplay, US Security Exchange Commission ﬁlings, various govern-
ment transportation and maritime incident reports which include but
are limited to Italian Ministry of Infrastructure, and Transport UK
Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB), US National Transporta-
tion Safety Board, Transportation Safety Board of Canada, Australian
Transport Safety Bureau, Bureau of Maritime Affairs — Republic of
Liberia, Italian Ministry of Infrastructures and Transports, United
States Coast Guard andMarine Safety Investigation Unit—Malta Trans-
port Center.
In addition to reviewing themultiple archival sources, Dr. Klein uses
Google Alert to ﬁnd relative information pertaining toworldwide cruise
ship incidents. Further, eye witnesses to cruise incidents can self-report
to the website as well. Dr Klein's data have been collected and archived
since 1997. Dr Klein states that every effort is made to verify data pre-
sented. His methodology for verifying the validity of each incident
made public is to cite multiple sources that relate to the incident.
Although this website appears to be a comprehensive, multiple
source dataset on cruise disasters and mishaps, it is difﬁcult to deter-
mine if incidents were omitted. In order to conﬁrm that the dataset is
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reported in Lloyd's Register World Casualties Report appear in the
dataset. Therefore, based on the number of incidents and the years
covered, it appears reasonably accurate. However, prior research
shows that the number of unreported maritime vessel accidents make
up about 50% of all occurred accidents (Hassel, Asbjørnslett, & Hole,
2014). Further, the comparability of information in the tables of
incidents provided in the dataset appears to be comprehensive.
Archival datasets are considered objective; however, they are a re-
sult of the information gathered which may have subjective accounts
of events. This website and its data are free to the public. Thus, there
is no incentive to inaccurately skew or report the data. However, in
reporting events, investigators, government agencies, and witnesses as
humans can make errors. Further, errors in compilation can also occur.
The public availability and nature of this dataset's information provide
edit checks and review for consistency. Therefore, there is little incen-
tive to maintain incomplete and erroneous information by the author.
However, Dr Klein does not assume liability for the correctness of the
information.
8. Categorization of incidents
In this paper, we focus on the causes of mishaps not fully addressed
in the previous literature, and on the requirements of SOLAS in the
broad categories of the ship and its crew (rather than on the passen-
gers). For example, we do not address illness outbreaks that have
been prevalent in the recent news reports. Furthermore, we look to
the disaster research to augment the previous research on incident
causes.
The main objective of the SOLAS Convention is to specify minimum
standards for the construction, equipment and operation of ships, com-
patible with their safety (IMO, 2014). The country underwhich the ship
is ﬂagged is responsible to ensure compliance with the Convention and
the documentation as proof of compliance. Under the minimum stan-
dards of construction, passenger ships must have subdivision into wa-
tertight compartments, stability requirements and safe electrical
systems andmachinery. Fire protection, detection and extinction equip-
ment are also required as are lifesaving appliances, and radio communi-
cations. Furthermore, certain safety of navigation procedures and
standards must be maintained on board including procedures for
dangerous cargo (IMO, 2014). Therefore, we can categorize the safety
concerns addressed under SOLAS into three areas: the ship design, the
crew safety procedures and the maintenance of ship equipment.
In research design, the criteria for interpreting the ﬁndings are crit-
ical (Yin, 1989). The protocol here includes consistent categorization.
After reviewing the dataset (with the specialized knowledge from a
marine engineer who is one of the authors) focusing on incidents
caused by the ship or crew, it appears that there are four main causes
for mishap/disaster. However, the incidents are placed into seven cate-
gories (acknowledging more than one cause may be possible): (1) lack
of proper maintenance, (2) human error by crew, (3) ﬂaw in ship
design, (4) unknown, (5) the combination of ship design ﬂaws and
the lack of proper maintenance, (6) the combination of human error
by the crew and the lack of proper maintenance, and (7) the combina-
tion of ship design and human error. These categories represent the
three areas of safety concerns addressed under SOLAS: the ship design,
the crew safety procedures and themaintenance of ship equipment and
the various combinations of the three areas.
A ﬂaw in ship design incident (mishap/disaster) is deﬁned as an in-
cident with faulty equipment such as values, pipes, or incidents where
long structural cracks appeared. Human error or lack of crew training
incidents are incidents where the crew ran the ship aground, collided
with piers and other ships, or failed seamanship in rough seas or inclem-
ent weather. Further, these incidents include incidents where general
crew is involved in ﬁres or other aboard ship mishaps. Lack of mainte-
nance issues includes incidents involving engine trouble, propulsiontrouble, generator malfunction, mechanical issues, gangway repairs,
bridge equipment failure and electrical and plumbing failures. Un-
known incidents included incidents with very little information avail-
able such as a reported ﬁre on board with no cause or location. For
example, if a cruise ship experienced a mechanical issue but no speciﬁc
information is given as to the cause, then it is placed in the unknown
category.
Here are some examples that illustrate the categorization of inci-
dents. An example of the lack of proper maintenance is the recent
generator failure aboard the Carnival Triumph. As a result of this failure,
the plumbing, electrical systems and the ship's propulsion did not work
leaving passengers without essential services for several days (Grifﬁn &
Bronstein, 2013). An example of human error by the crew is illustrated
by the 2012 Costa Concordia incident. Here, the lack of attention from
the captain and his deck crew resulted in a navigation error. The ship
ran aground and 32 people lost their lives (Ministry of Infrastructure
and Tranports, 2013). Finally, an example of a ﬂaw in ship design is
the 2006 ﬁre aboard the Star Princess. This ﬁre spread through 150
cabins and could have been contained by a better sprinkler system. Fur-
ther, the balconies lacked ﬁre protection and contained combustible
materials (Marine Accident Investigation Branch, 2006).
9. Findings and discussion
The following table shows the results of the two-step measurement
analysis and the categorization protocol. Table 1 shows the number of
incidents of cruise shipmishaps and disasters by cause by year including
the percentage of total incidents by cause over the entire time period
from 1989 to 2013 and the total number of cruise passengers each
year. The most common cause was found to be the lack of propermain-
tenance causing 60.52% of the mishaps, followed by human error by
crew at 26.2%, an unknown cause at 3.79%, the combination of ship
design ﬂaws and the lack of proper maintenance at 3.45%, ship design
ﬂaws alone at 2.93%, the combination of human error by the crew and
the lack of proper maintenance at 2.76%, and the combination of ship
design and human error by the crew at less than 1%. As a percentage
of the total passengers traveled in a year, not one cause in any year
affects more than .8% of the total passengers traveling on cruise ships.
10. Contribution to scholarly knowledge
In analyzing a problem, often determining what happened in the
past is important. Further, the cause of what happened in the past is
the ﬁrst step in prevention of future events. This is the point of this
research paper — to identify the cause of disaster/mishap to begin to
suggest solutions for prevention. This methodologically sound assess-
ment and evaluation of a large number of cruise ship mishaps/disasters
over 24 years attempts to add to the knowledge for ship cruise opera-
tors to help develop new methods of prevention and reduction of mis-
haps/disasters. This methodology has helped reveal four causal factors
of cruise ship mishaps: ship design ﬂaws, human error by the crew,
the lack of proper maintenance of the ship and an undetermined
cause. If more than one of these factors is present, the combination of
the factors may cause more damage and loss of life (Talley et al., 2008).
The ship design for cruise ships is very complex as opposed to mer-
chant ships. Cruise ships provide hotel service (e.g. heating, plumbing,
electricity, etc.) for up to 4000+ passengers whereas merchant ships
need hotel service for only about 15 to 30 crewmembers. Further,
passenger ships and ferries have a high demand on timely service and
quick port turnaround. Also, the ship design of cruise ships makes ship
maintenance more complex than merchant ships yet turnover time in
port is faster than merchant ships — typically less than one day (Port
Of Canaveral, 2014; Rodrigue & Notteboom, 2008). This short amount
of time may result in neglected repairs and exhausted crew. This
exhaustion may increase human error by the crew. Further, human
error may result from lack of crew training due to short turnaround
Table 1
Number of incidents of cruise ship mishaps by cause by year.
Years Ship Design Maintenance Unknown
2013 2 4 8 0 3 2 2 20,976
2012 2 15 36 2 15 4 7 20,335
2011 1 8 29 0 0 0 0 19,377
2010 2 14 41 0 1 1 0 18,421
2009 1 10 27 0 0 1 1 17,216
2008 1 20 39 0 0 0 1 15,779
2007 0 15 22 0 0 3 1 14,625
2006 1 14 35 0 1 0 1 12,006
2005 0 4 34 0 0 1 2 11,180
2004 2 9 19 0 0 1 0 10,460
2003 2 5 11 0 0 1 1 9,526
2002 1 8 15 0 0 0 0 8,648
2001 1 4 7 0 0 1 0 7,499
2000 0 2 14 0 0 0 2 7,214
1999 and
earlier 1 20 14 0 0 1 4
Total 17 152 351 2 20 16 22 199,599
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mance particularly during a ship crisis. Further, the global nature of
the crewmembership and passenger mix creates language and cultural
barriers, which may cause miscommunication resulting in mistakes.
These factors may help explain over 77% of the mishaps evaluated here.
Since cruise disasters/mishaps are infrequent, they generally
have low planning priorities. Response planning tends to be either
overestimated or underestimated (Tierney, Lindell, & Perry, 2001).
Effective disaster response requires proper preparation. Proper prepara-
tion involves not only pre-planning for prevention, but the right plan for
implementation of the right decisions for the post-disaster response
(Mileski & Honeycutt, 2013).
Mileski and Honeycutt (2013) look at three factors in dealing with a
maritime disaster. The ﬁrst factor is the ability for response. The ability
of the response is dependent on the ability to use the maritime assets
available and the level of design speciﬁcity of the maritime assets.
The second factor is the experience for the response. Those who
respond must have the experience to deploy necessary resources.
Experience with disasters is a key factor to an effective response
(Tierney et al., 2001). And, the third factor is the staging of the re-
sponse. Understanding the where, when and with what of strategic
positioning of maritime resources also involves experience. Yet
understanding how maritime assets can be integrated in a disaster
response requires the skill of crew.
Cruise ships can drill for disaster response, but it can often become
routinized. Further, the crew may draw on the experience of ordinary
emergencies. Realistic abilities andmaritime assets are needed for plan-
ning for a cruise ship disaster. Therefore, greater contingency ﬂexibility
is needed in all disaster planning (Quarantelli, 1982). Maritime assets
that are ﬂexible in deployment with crew skills can better serve in
maritime disasters (Mileski & Honeycutt, 2013).So reiterating the above ﬁndings into prior research, cruise ships
need to focus on three elements to avoid disaster/mishap problems.
The ﬁrst element is the pre-disaster planning or the right ship design.
The second element is the right implementation of the plan or the
correct use of the ship. For this element, a well-trained crew or lack of
human error is required. Finally, ﬂexible resources that are well main-
tained are needed, and thus maintenance of all resources on a ship can
avoid the damage of a cruise disaster.
11. Implications for managerial practice
• For risk assessment
Shipping companies often expose themselves in a highly competitive
market. Cruise business features riskswhich challenge the companies'
efforts to stay competitive under the current economic conditions.
Companies canmanage their risk-takingbehavior through risk assess-
ment and ﬁnancial management. However, technical and physical
risks that refer to the possible break down of a vessel, mishaps, and
loss of vessel and human life will result in inevitable damage to a
company's reputation. The results of the paper provide important in-
formation to the cruise community and regulators as to what safety
standard should be implemented and review regularly and how risk
management procedure should be taken to ensure the shipping
companies' sound operation under various uncertain circumstances.
• Maintenance procedures
Although cruise ship disasters are rare, more can be done by the in-
dustry tomake the recreational cruise experience safe and uneventful.
Based upon the results of this research, we now know themain cause
of cruise shipmishaps and disasters. In addition to awell-trained crew
and ﬂexible resources available to the crew during a mishap/disaster,
new technologies in the ship design may be needed to enhance
70 J.P. Mileski et al. / Research in Transportation Business & Management 13 (2014) 65–70maintenance schedules such as compartmentalization of ship compo-
nent parts for ease of removal and replacement in port. Evaluation of
the effectiveness of current best practices of maintenance must be
considered such as the turnaround time of the vessel, the number of
maintenance crew members and the technology support for mainte-
nance in the ports selected by the cruise lines. However, more
research is needed to pinpoint speciﬁc maintenance issues, and
work needs to be done on whether speciﬁc ship characteristics
contribute to increased risk for mishaps/disasters such as ﬂag, crew
composition, ports or call. Future research should focus on the risk
prediction of the likelihood of a mishap.
Merchant vessel safety research has focused on creating a climate of
safety on vessels. Unsafe crew actions noticeably contribute to acci-
dents. Management commitment is the main focus of contemporary
safety climate implementation including training and the presence of
safety committees and safety ofﬁcers (Lu & Tsai, 2008). Creating a cli-
mate of safety both on cruise ships and in the maintenance operations
of cruise shipsmay provide an answer to reducingmishaps in an already
safe industry.
12. Conclusion
This research provides the ﬁrst step to future research regarding
cruise operations, cruise company efﬁciency and cruise risk assessment
and to bring insightful empirical ground for practitioners and policy
makers. Events, though rare, attract global media attention and can
tarnish brand reputation critical for successful business performance.
Further, knowing the factors that contribute to cruise ship mishaps
and failures can provide a foundation of preparedness that may prevent
future disasters in the cruise industry.
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